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I
INTRODUCTION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed a Memorandum Decision in the
above-entitled matter, case no. 940747-CA, on September 14, 1995.
The Court ruled that the Appellant's arguments on appeal were
meritless.

However, the Court felt that the sanction of

dismissal which was meted out by the district court was too harsh
under the circumstances and reversed the court's dismissal
calling it an abuse of discretion.

See Appendix A, Memorandum

Decision.
Defendant Continental Banking Company respectfully requests
that a rehearing of this matter would be beneficial in light of
facts which were not considered by this Court which would
demonstrate that the district court did not abuse its discretion
and that its decision in dismissing the action may be properly
upheld.

Defendant Continental Baking Company and its counsel

specifically represent and aver that this Petition for Rehearing
is presented in good faith and not for purposes of delay.
Defendant believes rehearing will present the most efficient and
efficacious resolution of this matter.
II
POINTS OF FACT AND LAW WHICH MERIT REHEARING
1.

Defendant Continental Banking Company raised an

argument in the court below that Appellant further violated the
court's discovery order by failing to give full and complete
-2-

answers to interrogatory requests and document production
requests.

This Court declined to reach the issue, stating that

the argument was not presented to the trial court.

See

Memorandum Decision, at n. 2.
2.

The court failed to consider the fact that the sanction

of dismissal was specifically known to Plaintiff as a consequence
of his failure to respond to the court-ordered discovery.

The

facts also demonstrate a repeated and knowing failure to comply
with the Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the court's
specific order compelling discovery.
Ill
ARGUMENT
L.

APPELLEE RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE ADEQUACY OF
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO DISCOVERY IN THE COURT BELOW
WHICH THE COURT DECLINED TO ADDRESS AND SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED ON REHEARING.

In footnote 2 of the court's Memorandum Decision, this Court
declined to address the alternative theory raised by Defendant
that, in addition to being late, the Plaintiff's answers to
interrogatories and requests for production of documents also
violated the court's specific order because they were not full
and complete answers justifying dismissal.

See Appendix "A".

The Court stated in footnote 2, "In addition, we do not reach
appellee's argument that appellant further violated the court's
discovery order by failing to give complete answers to the
interrogatory requests.

This argument was not presented to the
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trial court, and we decline to reach it for the first time on
appeal."

See Memorandum Decision, fn. 2; Appendix "A",

A review

of the record on appeal demonstrates that the Defendant did in
fact raise the issue with the trial court.

In its Opposition to

Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment, Defendant made
specific arguments addressing the fact that the answers to
discovery, even if deemed timely, were nonresponsive and violated
the court's order, warranting dismissal.

See R. 379, 365,

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Relief from Judgment.

See Appendix "B".

The arguments set forth

in that memorandum specifically address the fact that the court
had required full and complete answers to the discovery by the
court-imposed deadline.

Id.

The memorandum sets forth

specifically that the answers were inadequate because they did
not disclose any of the information which Plaintiff stated that
he was ready to present at trial even though several months had
passed.

Instead, the answers to discovery merely indicated that

information had been given to Plaintiff's experts and that
Plaintiff was awaiting responses.

Id.

Therefore, if this Court

would re-examine the record in this case, it would become
apparent that the Defendant's argument on appeal in Section IV of
the Brief merits consideration by the Court prior to conclusion
of this matter in the Court of Appeals.
IL.

THE COURT, IN RECONSIDERING THIS MATTER, SHOULD ADDRESS
THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WITTINGLY VIOLATED A COURT
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ORDER WHICH EXPRESSLY STATED THAT THE SANCTION OF
DISMISSAL WOULD BE THE RESULT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY,
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court cited to cases such as
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah App. 1991), stating
that the sanction of dismissal was improper absent multiple
instances of abuse and repeated willful failure to respond to
discovery.

On reconsideration, the Court should examine the

facts again with the understanding that Plaintiff had represented
that it was ready to present new evidence and new expert theories
on the eve of trial.

As demonstrated in the record, trial was

expressly continued so that discovery of the expert's opinion
could be obtained from the Plaintiff.

Request for production of

documents and interrogatories were sent to Plaintiff four days
after the trial was continued.
Thereafter Plaintiff completely failed to answer the
Defendant's requests, failed to reply to counsel's correspondence
and failed to file any response to Defendant's motion to compel
discovery.

Plaintiff completely failed to provide the answers as

ordered by the court, knowing that the court had ruled that
dismissal would be the result of his failure to respond as
indicated in the court's order compelling discovery.

Therefore,

Plaintiff acted multiple times and knowingly failed to respond by
(1) failing to provide answers to discovery in any manner, (2)
failing to respond to the motion to compel, (3) failing to
respond to the court's order, and (4) failing to provide full and
-5-

complete answers as required by the court order when the
Plaintiff did in fact provide answers.

This is precisely the

type of conduct which merits the censure of dismissal.

See

Charlie Brown Construction Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d
1368 Utah App. cert denied 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
Moreover, this Court failed to distinguish with any
discussion, the fact that the sanction of dismissal was known to
Plaintiff and contained in the order compelling discovery served
upon him.

The record shows Plaintiff was well aware that his

failure to comply with the discovery order would result in
dismissal of his case.

This is a far cry from reviewing a case

where a judge imposes the sanction of dismissal for a discovery
violation after the fact.

In this case, Plaintiff's acts were a

direct violation of an order which expressly stated that failure
to comply would be met with the sanction of dismissal.

On

appeal, this Court fails to address these facts in its analysis
and should be considered by the Court in determining whether or
not the trial court abused its discretion.
Appellee Continental Banking contends that once the district
court makes an order, especially one which the Plaintiff knows
the threatened sanction beforehand, the authority of the court to
impose the sanction in managing its docket should be reviewed
very deferentially under the abuse of discretion standard.
Appellee believes that reconsideration of the facts relevant to
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Plaintiff's knowledge that he would face the sanction of
dismissal, mitigate the apparent harshness of the sanction.
Defendant further contends that the Court did not explain or
consider how the trial court abused its discretion but merely
felt that under the circumstances its collective judgment would
have been different. This Court does not address the specific
facts of this case or set forth why, given the facts of this
case, "no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial
court" necessary to find an abuse of discretion.

See State v.

Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978); see also State v. Larson,
865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993).
CONCLUSION
Defendant Continental Banking asserts that a rehearing of
this matter is warranted to address Defendant's alternative
argument that Plaintiff's answers to the discovery, even if
deemed timely, were also violative of the court order.
Further, a review of the facts demonstrates that Plaintiff
wittingly violated a court order, knowing that the consequence of
the violation would be dismissal of the case. Re-examination of
the facts will demonstrate that the Plaintiff's conduct in this
matter was sufficiently repetitious, callous and egregious so
that a reasonable court could have adopted the view taken by the
trial court in this matter. Therefore, the Appellate Court
should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
and should make Plaintiff's burden on appeal to demonstrate that
-7-

the court did in fact abuse its discretion and that no reasonable
court could have taken the view adopted by the trial court.
Defendant requests rehearing of this matter in order to clarify
the Court's holding and ensure that all factors, both legal and
factual, are considered by this Court.
Respectfully submitted this

day of (-2Ji^\^J>L>^-

1995.

HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

PLANT
BRADLEY R. HELSTEN
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing motion by
mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing document,
postage prepaid, this j^Afday of <:^g^0V9^/J^>-S>—the following:

DENVER C. SNUFFER, JR.
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
William W. Morton
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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APPENDIX
A.

Memorandum Decision

B.

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Relief From Judgment
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William W. Morton,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 940747-CA

v.
Continental Baking Company,
Defendant and Appellee.

F I L E D
(September 14, 1995)

Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Ray M. Harding
Attorneys:

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Sandy, for Appellant
Terry M. Plant and Bradley R. Helsten, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Jackson.
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
William W. Morton appeals from the trial courts order
dismissing with prejudice his personal injury action based upon
failure to comply with a discovery order. We reverse and
remand.
We have reviewed each of the issues raised by appellant
regarding excuses for noncompliance with the court's discovery
order, or reasons for extension of the court imposed deadline,
and have found them to be without merit. However, despite
appellant's failure to timely comply with the trial court's
order, we also note the well established proposition that
dismissal "is an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted
out with caution." ^rfri*icrtonivl Wafref*ffif2?P-2&/452, 456 (Utah
App. 1991) ; SfegMAgOgUtah Deo't-of->Transtr.^v.^Oscfuthorpe^ 892
C£*2~d?r4, 7 (UtafT*Y§^1ffi^ Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v.
Micro-dex Corp,, 739 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah App. 1987). Our
1. We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are
adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah
R. App. P. 29(a)(3).

rc/iew of the cases affirming a ruling of dismissal with
c -ajudice or a ruling of default ^ dgment: indicates that such
a m o n is :sually approvea in case. inv-»ving more egregious
neglect ar.i misconduct: than is present . ; the case at hand. See
Osguthoroe. 392 P.2d at 9 (affirming der^ult judgment because
defendant " x had multiple and repeated opportunities to assert his
claims and positions and has flagrantly neglected to do so'")
(citation omitted); tiarseh v. Collina,-* 684 P.2d 52, 54-55'*\utah
1984) (affirming default judgment in light of defendant's
repeated wilful failure to respond to discovery or to continue to
participate in the case in any way) ; jg5f^a*?Mat.*»Insv Co*; v*»
SchQ^lPerv^76S^P.2d 9SQ^^9£2.^tV3&^J®V>J^l3M$±t
(affirming default
judgment in view of defendant's failure to comply with discovery
orders, multiple instances of intimidation of witnesses, bribery
attempts, and other "aggravated misconduct"); Cftarlie-Brown»
Cortstzxm'Go * > v. Leisure-Sports, Inc.^TJEQL P;24^ 1368 (Utah App.)
(affirming dismissal with prejudice due to multiple instances of
failure to appear at court hearings and failure to timely
prosecute the case), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). We
agree that appellant's conduct merited sanction and acknowledge
the discretion given trial courts regarding the imposition of
discovery sanctions. See Darrincrton, 812 P.2d at 457. We are
constrained, however, to follow prior decisions approving
dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37 only under
circumstances much more egregious than those in evidence here.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision to dismiss the
case with prejudice as an abuse of discretion and remand the
matter for further proceedings.
Further, due to appellant's utter failure to address the
trial court's imposition of sanctions, including attorney fees,
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arising from appellant's improper allegations of fraud, we
dec^rlne to^ reach the issue.2

WE CONCUR:

Gregor

Orme, Presiding Judge

£&&£v*>t.
Norman H. Jackson,Pffudge

^cpy or i
~.^.v.sr»t on ,.ij ,;•«
. ...i o^..«: or
Appeals. :.i i~•: :ny whereof, 1 have *,GL my hand and
affixed the s^alov (he Court.

Jl-frwK

ilyi

Clerk of )he7Court
By j .

.fcS i -

Deputy Clerk

<6W&r

Date

2. In addition, we do not reach appellee,s argument that
appellant further violated the court's discovery order by failing
to give complete answers to the interrogatory requests. This
argument was not presented to the trial court, and we decline to
reach it for the first time on appeal. See Ong Int'l (U.S.A.)
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) (general
rule is to decline consideration of issues raised for first time
on appeal).

940747-CA
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180)
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM W. MORTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
|
]|
|
|

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

|
I

Civil No. 910400454PI
Judge Ray M. Harding

CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant.

The defendant, Continental Baking Company, submits the
following memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Relief'
from Judgment.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

As stated by Plaintiff in his Motion for Relief from

Judgment, this matter has been set for trial on two different
occasions and was continued initially due to medical problems being
experienced by the plaintiff.
2.
1994.

This matter was again set for trial on January 11,

On January 10, 1994, Defendant's counsel received a call

from Plaintiff's counsel with Mr. Phil Hoyt, Plaintiff's expert
witness, present on the telephone line explaining to Defendant's
counsel that Plaintiff would be offering new evidence through

Mr. Hoyt and a new theory of liability against the Defendant.

In

response, Defendant's counsel instructed Plaintiff's counsel that
new evidence at that late hour was unacceptable, and a telephone
conference was initiated with the Court.

After discussing this

matter with the Court, it was decided that in order that Plaintiff
be given the opportunity to present this evidence fairly, the trial
date be continued and was, in fact, continued until August 1994.
It

is

important

to

remember

and

particularly

relevant

to

Plaintiff's motion for relief that the reason the trial date was
continued

was

because

of

new evidence

that was

introduced through Plaintiff's expert, Phil Hoyt.

going

to

be

Further, that

evidence was represented to be prepared and ready to be presented
at the January 11, 1994 trial.
3.

Four days later, on January 14, Defendant served

upon Plaintiff's counsel various interrogatories and requests for
production of documents which in large part sought to obtain the
new evidence that Plaintiff was ready to utilize at trial and which
was the reason the trial date was continued. Other information was
requested;

however,

the

purpose

of

these

interrogatories

and

requests for production of documents was to give the Defendant the
information that formed the basis for continuing the trial.

(See

interrogatories and requests for production of documents which were
attached to Defendant's Motion to Compel filed June 16, 1994.)
4.

After receiving no responses to the interrogatories

or requests for production of documents, on February 25, 1994,
-2-

approximately

10 days after the answers to interrogatories and

requests for production of documents were due, Defendant's counsel
wrote a letter (a copy of which is attached hereto as "Exhibit A") ,
explaining to Plaintiff's counsel the need to receive an immediate
response to the discovery requests and an explanation that if
responses were not received on or before March 10, a motion to
compel would be filed.

The letter then goes on to indicate that

before any depositions would be taken in this matter, it was
necessary

that

answers

to

interrogatories

production of documents be received*
to

the

interrogatories

or

and

requests

for

After receiving no response

requests,

on

March

16,

1994, the

Defendant filed its Motion to Compel, 6 days beyond the time that
was set forth in the letter of February 25, 1994.
5.

Having

received

no

word

whatsoever

from

the

Plaintiff or responses to the outstanding discovery requests, onv
March 29, thirteen days after the Motion to Compel was filed,
Defendant submitted to Plaintiff a Notice to Submit for Decision
and a proposed Order which would have given Plaintiff up to April 8
to

provide

answers

to

production of documents.

the

interrogatories

and

requests

for

This Notice to Submit for Decision and

proposed Order were mailed to Plaintiff's counsel at 10885 South
State

Street,

Sandy,

Utah

84070, on March 29,

1994.

(See

Certificate of Mailing and attached Affidavit of Lynn Javadi.)
Again, nothing was received from the plaintiff in response to the
Notice to Submit for Decision.
-3-

6.

On April 12, 1994, Defendant's counsel called the

Clerk of the Court to inquire regarding the status of the Court's
entry of the proposed Order submitted with the Notice to Submit for
Decision.

Defendant's counsel initially spoke with the Court's

Clerk, Joe Morton, concerning the status of the Order and later
that same day received a telephone call from Mr. Morton, wherein he
explained that the Court would not sign the Order submitted with
the Notice

to Submit for Decision, but rather requested

that

counsel prepare a new Order giving the Plaintiff 10 days from that
date to respond to the discovery and upon failure to do so, the
Order was to include specific language that the matter would be
dismissed with prejudice.

(See Order Granting Defendant's Motion

to Compel and Awarding Attorney Fees, dated April 12, 1994.)
7.

On April 12, 1994, the Order Granting Defendant's

Motion to Compel and Awarding Attorney Fees was entered by the
Court, which by its own terms made all responses to the discovery
requests due on or before April 22 at 5:00 o'clock p.m. (10 days
after

the

Certificate

signing
of

of

Mailing

the

Order) .

signed

by

In
Bryan

accordance
Hale

of

with

the

Defendant's

attorney's office, a copy of the Order was mailed to Plaintiff's
counsel in the same manner that Defendant's counsel has always
dealt with Plaintiff's counsel in providing him documents.

It is

interesting to note that Plaintiff's counsel acknowledges receipt
of the Motion to Compel which was served upon him in this same
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manner.

(See Affidavits of Bryan Hale and Lynn Javadi attached

hereto.)
8.

As of April 22, 1994 at 5:05 p.m., no responses to

the outstanding discovery requests had been received, nor had there
been

any

communication

from

Plaintiff's

concerning those discovery requests.

counsel

whatsoever

(See Affidavit of Terry M.

Plant dated April 22, 1994, previously submitted with motion for
order of dismissal.)
9.

On the next business day, which was April 25, 1994,

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Order
Compelling Discovery was hand delivered to the Court by Mr. John N.
Braithwaite,

an

Mr. Braithwaite

attorney

at

defense

also personally

motion, memorandum

counsel's

hand delivered

law

firm.

a copy of the

in support of motion to dismiss, order of

dismissal and letter to the Court to the office of Plaintiff's
counsel on that same day.

(See Affidavit of John N. Braithwaite,

attached hereto.)
10.

Included with the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

Comply with Order Compelling Discovery and supporting memorandum,
which documents were hand delivered to Plaintiff's counsel's law
firm

by

Mr.

Braithwaite,

was

a copy

of

the

Order

Granting

Defendant's Motion to Compel and Awarding Attorney Fees attached to
the memorandum as "Exhibit A" and a copy of the Affidavit of Terry
M. Plant, setting forth the fact that no responses to the discovery
requests had been received at the time the matter was submitted to
-5-

the Court.
office.

The hand deliveries were made to Plaintiff's counsel's

(See Affidavit of John N. Braithwaite.)
11.

On April

25, 1994, at approximately

2:15

p.m.,

Defendant's counsel received, by means of facsimile, answers to
interrogatories
documents.

and

responses

to

requests

for

production

of

A copy of those answers received on April 25, 1994 are

attached hereto as "Exhibit B."
12.

The Order of the Court dated April 12, 1994 not only

required that the answers be received by April 22 at 5:00 o'clock
p.m., but also required that "full and complete responses" to the
interrogatories
received.

and

The

requests

Court

is

for

production

directed

to

the

of

documents

responses

to

be
the

interrogatories and particularly answers to Interrogatories Nos. 8,
.9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.

Plaintiff's counsel essentially states

that the interrogatories had been provided to his various witnesses
and that on some unknown day in the future the interrogatories
would be answered when his experts saw fit to provide him with the
information.

Further, the interrogatories talk about future site

visits which will be made by Mr. Phil Hoyt, Plaintiff's expert, and
which will require that the interrogatories be supplemented.
13*

As to the request

for production

of documents,

Answer No. 2 refers to photocopies of pictures that were being
produced.

No such pictures were attached.

Answer no. 3 makes

reference to notes, calculations and writings of various experts
and the response is given that these notes have already been
-6-

provided as to Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Remington, in spite of the fact
that Mr. Hoyt apparently is changing his testimony, and that they
will be provided regarding Greg Duval, but were not at the time the
responses were given.
objects

to

the

information.

In response to Request No. 4, Plaintiff

information

requested

without

providing

any

Requests Nos. 5 and 6 are both answered by "See

accompanying documents." No documents of any kind accompanied the
faxed responses.
14.
Court

On or about May 5, 1994, after not hearing from the

concerning

this

matter

and

having

heard

nothing

from

Plaintiff's counsel, counsel for the Defendant called the Court to
inquire concerning whether the Order dismissing Plaintiff's case
had been entered.

It was then that Defendant's counsel was

informed by the Clerk of the Court that the Order of the Court had
been signed on April 28, 1994. On May 6, 1994, Defendant's counsel
personally traveled to the Court to inspect the Court's file to
make certain that all certificates of service pertaining to the
various notices and motions at issue here were properly contained
in the file.
issues

raised

Every document sent to the Court concerning the
by

Defendant's

Motion

to

certificate of mailing and/or hand delivery.
15.

Compel

contained

a

(See Court file.)

On May 6, 1994, in accordance with Rule 58(A) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a Notice of Signing of Judgment was
sent to Plaintiff's counsel.

Again, the same certificate of

delivery was signed as had been signed in all other mailings and
-7-

deliveries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel acknowledges receipt
of this pleading, which was delivered in the same manner as the
various other pleadings.
16.

(See Affidavit of Denver Snuffer, H 10.)

On May 10, 1994, the Defendant received the enclosed

Certificate of Delivery, Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories to
Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Production of Documents ("Exhibit C " ) .
The Court will note that the answers to the interrogatories are
identical to those provided in the earlier facsimile on April 25
and that, for the first time on May 10, 1994, Plaintiff provided
responses to requests for production of documents.

However, those

responses only include an Affidavit of Stan Holyoak, a statement of
Gale Pike, a statement of Marvin Ainge, and some photocopies of
photographs.
Requests

Nos.

No responses have been received
3

or

4,

and

as

admitted

in

in response to
Plaintiff's

own

memorandum, all statements responsive to Requests Nos. 4 and 5 havenot been provided.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO TIMELY RESPOND TO
DISCOVERY AND HIS "EXCUSES" DO NOT RISE TO THE
LEVEL OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
THE PERTINENT
DOCUMENTS WERE ALL SERVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND THE MOTION TO
DISMISS AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WERE HAND
DELIVERED, EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDING A CLAIM THAT
THE DOCUMENTS WERE NOT RECEIVED.
A.

All relevant documents were received by
Plaintiff's counsel.

At
attempt

to

the outset, it should be noted
avoid

the various

court

orders

that

Plaintiff's

is based

upon

an

assertion that Plaintiff's counsel did not properly receive various
pleadings. In other words, it appears that Plaintiff is attempting
to explain his "excusable neglect" by alleging that the Defendant
failed to provide proper notice of the various pleadings and other
documents which have been submitted.

Not only is such an approach

offensive in that it attempts to cast the blame away from where it
belongs, which is squarely on the shoulders of Plaintiff's counsel,
but it is totally unfounded given the certificates of service and
the supporting

affidavits

from various members

of Defendant's

counsel's office, including Mr. John Braithwaite, a partner in the
firm of Hanson, Epperson & Smith, who has prepared an affidavit
indicating that the crucial documents were served personally by
means of hand delivery, as well as Lynn Javadi and Bryan Hale,
other members of Defendant's attorney's law firm. These affidavits
and

certificates

of

service

conclusively

establish

that

all

relevant documents were served upon Plaintiff in accordance with
Rule 5(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Apparently,

Plaintiff's counsel does not have a system within his office to
ensure that he receives documents mailed or delivered to him.

If

so, it certainly cannot be "excusable neglect" when he does not
receive those documents.
Further, it appears to be Plaintiff's position that
somehow he received certain documents, i.e., the Motion to Compel
-9-

and the Notice of Signing of Judgment, and yet, for some reason, he
did not receive the Notice to Submit for Decision, together with
the proposed Order, the Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel
and Awarding Attorney Fees, the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Comply with Order, together with its supporting memorandum and the
Order of Dismissal itself, as well as the cover letter dated
April 25, 1994, which was hand delivered to the Court and to
Plaintiff's counsel.
delivered

All of these documents were either hand

or properly mailed.

Plaintiff's

counsel

offers

no

explanation as to why he received some of the papers and not
others, in spite of the fact that service was properly made on all
documents.
Rule

5(b)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

specifically outlines the proper means of service of pleadings and
papers such as those involved in this matter on a party. That rule
specifically

provides

for

service

by

mailing

the

papers

to

Plaintiff's counsel at his known address or by leaving the papers
at the attorney's office with his clerk or other person in charge
thereof.

Both means of service have been utilized in this case to

make certain that Plaintiff's counsel had notice of the proceedings
concerning the Motion to Compel and orders relating thereto. Every
communication with the Court was served upon the Plaintiff in
accordance with Rule 5, and to ensure that Plaintiff's counsel
obtained these documents, the Motion to Dismiss, together with the
Order of Dismissal, was hand delivered by an attorney to the office
-10-

of Plaintiff's counsel.

The Order Granting Defendant's Motion to

Compel and Awarding Attorney Fees was attached as "Exhibit A M to
the papers that were hand delivered with the motion to dismiss on
April 25, 1994.

Defendant's counsel does not know what he could

have done beyond what was done in this case to properly ensure that
Plaintiff received notice of the proceedings.
B.

Given Plaintiff's counsel's notice of the
pending Motion to Compel and overdue
responses, his actions do not rise to the
level of "excusable neglect."

In his Motion for Relief from Judgment, Plaintiff's
counsel acknowledges receipt of the Motion to Compel, which was
sent by mail on March 16, 1994.
H 7.)

(See Affidavit of Denver Snuffer,

From that day forward, Plaintiff's counsel did nothing to

respond to the motion.

Rather, according to his own affidavit he

waited an additional 40 days and then faxed incomplete responses to
Defendant's counsel. Plaintiff's counsel then did nothing further,
in spite of the fact that on April 25, 1994 the Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to Comply with Order Compelling Discovery and the Order
of Dismissal were hand delivered to Plaintiff's attorney's office.
Plaintiff then claims his next notice was the Notice of Signing of
Judgment, which was served upon the Plaintiff in a manner identical
to the way the other pleadings had been sent to him.
Amazingly, Plaintiff comes before this Court seeking
relief from the judgment based upon mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect.

Even if Plaintiff's assertions that he did
-11-

not receive the various papers were taken at face value, it cannot
be excusable neglect for a party to be aware that answers to
interrogatories are outstanding, that the opposing counsel has sent
him a letter demanding answers to the discovery requests, and most
importantly, that a motion to compel has been filed and in spite of
all those things, do nothing.

Here, Plaintiff's counsel made no

attempt to contact Defendant's counsel to seek an extension or to
provide any explanation as to why the answers were not provided to
Defendant's counsel.

Instead, he chose to ignore the motion to

compel and now attempts to rely upon his contention that he did not
receive the intervening papers.

The fact is, his office did

receive those intervening pleadings, which has been established
irrefutably by affidavits submitted with this memorandum.
fact,

he

did

explanation

is

not

get

because

those
of

documents,

problems

the

within

only
the

If, in

plausible
plaintiff's

attorney's own office, which falls well short of the mark in
establishing excusable neglect, especially in light of Plaintiff's
knowledge of the ongoing demands to respond to the outstanding
discovery requests and the actual filing of the motion to compel.
The Utah appellate courts have provided

guidance in

assessing whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b),
given the circumstances presented.

The Utah Supreme Court in the

case of Larson v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (1984), has stated that it
is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a
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movant has shown sufficient cause to obtain relief from judgment.
In that case, the Supreme Court stated:
A trial court has discretion in determining
whether
a
movant
has
shown
"mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"
and this Court will reverse the trial court's
rulings only when there has been abuse of
discretion.
684 P.2d at 54.
The plaintiff also attempts to argue the merits of his
case, explaining to the Court the great injustice that will be done
to his client due to the injuries sustained by his client in the
accident in question.

The defendant has vigorously disputed the

plaintiff's claims and contends that the complaint is without
merit.

It is not appropriate, however, under Rule 60(b) to examine

the merits of the claim.

Id. at 55.

In other words, the court in

Larson indicated that the merits and/or the substance of a case is
irrelevant

to

Rule

60(b)

relief.

Rather,

it

needs

to

be

established that proper grounds have been shown under Rule 60(b)
for relief from judgment to be granted.

Here, no such grounds

exist.
The cases which address this issue do not provide a
definitive formula for the determination of excusable neglect.

It

must be examined on a case-by-case basis, greatly relying upon the
discretion of the trial court, who has had dealings with the case
and who knows the specifics of the case.

-13-

See, State ex rel. Utah

State Dept. of Social Servs. v.

Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah

1983).
Here, Plaintiff's counsel knew that the trial date was
continued because of a controversy regarding his expert witnesses
and knew or reasonably should have known that the discovery at
issue in large part went to that new evidence.

He received the

interrogatories, a letter from Defendant's counsel, and the motion
to compel, and in spite of that did nothing to obtain an extension
of time to answer, either by requesting such an extension from
Defendant's counsel or by seeking an extension as would be allowed
under Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

He then

attempts to shift the blame for doing nothing by maintaining to
this Court that he did not receive copies of the Notice to Submit
for Decision, the Motion to Dismiss, supporting memorandum or Order
of Dismissal.

Even if counsel did not receive certain of the

papers, doing nothing under the above-stated circumstances is not
"excusable."

Furthermore, the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

Comply with Order Compelling Discovery, the memorandum in support
thereof, the Order of Dismissal and the cover letter to Judge
Harding were, in fact, hand delivered to the office of Plaintiff's
counsel.

While it is possible that one of several mailings could

have inexplicably become lost in the mail, it is impossible that
all of these documents were lost, particularly since the latter
documents were delivered by hand by an attorney from Defendant's
counsel's office. Therefore, the fault for Plaintiff's counsel not
-14-

receiving these documents must lie on him and cannot reasonably be
shifted to the defendant, as is attempted by Plaintiff's counsel.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF STILL HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE
COURT'S ORDER TO "DELIVER TO DEFENDANT FULL
AND COMPLETE RESPONSES" TO THE OUTSTANDING
DISCOVERY. THIS CONTINUED FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE ORDER SHOULD NOT BE EXCUSED.
Perhaps the most upsetting aspect of this case is that
Plaintiff still has not provided full and complete responses to the
outstanding discovery, in direct contravention of the Court's Order
of April 12, 1994. As set forth in the Statement of Facts hereto,
the basis for the continuance of the trial in January 1994 was new
testimony which was going to be propounded by Plaintiff's expert,
Phil Hoyt, and possibly others.

It is now four months later and

the information has not been divulged.

If it was to be presented

at trial on January 11, there is absolutely no excuse for a failure
to provide the information immediately in response to the discovery
requests and even more inexcusable that the information has still
not

been

divulged.

The

Court's

attention

is

directed

to

Interrogatories No. 8 and 9, which specifically request information
concerning different testimony than that identified in depositions
seasonably

taken

of

Plaintiff's

experts

Remington

and

Hoyt.

Instead of providing the information sought concerning that new
testimony,

Plaintiff

simply

states

Remington's testimony:
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as

follows

concerning

This answer requires direct information from
the expert as to what his testimony will be.
We will supplement this answer when Mr.
Remington provides us answer.
He is being
provided with these answers to interrogatories
and also with an accompanying production of
documents and asked to provide an answer to
this interrogatory.
In response to the same question concerning Mr. Hoyt, the
answer is given as follows:
Just as Don Remington is being provided these
answers and asked to respond to the preceding
question, Dr. Hoyt will also be given these
answers and asked to answer this question.
When the answer is received, it will be
forwarded to you.
A similar answer is given for Mr. Greg Duval, another
expert anticipated to be called, in answer to Interrogatory No. 10.
In addition, Plaintiff responded to Interrogatories Nos. 13 and 14
by stating that "it is anticipated that at some point Mr. Hoyt will
go to the scene and that the findings of his site visit will be
provided."
In other words, the very evidence which was primarily
responsible for the continuance of the trial and which became the
center of the focus of the interrogatories at issue, has still not
been provided.

Plaintiffs counsel apparently thinks that because

he has filed something, he is in compliance with the Court's Order.
The Court's Order required full and complete responses.

To this

date, the Plaintiff has still failed to comply and provide the
information. Plaintiffs counsel has had the interrogatories since
January 14, 1994.

In May of 1994, he is still telling the Court
-16-

that he will at some point submit these answers to interrogatories
and provide us the information requested from his experts*

Under

the circumstances of this case, considering the reason the trial in
this case was continued, such an approach is simply untenable and
should be offensive to the Court.
violation of the Court's order.

The Plaintiff

remains in

This continued violation of the

order defeats any claim of excusable neglect or any other reason
for relief under Rule 60(b) and further warrants dismissal at this
point even assuming some failure of Plaintiff's counsel to receive
certain papers.
Mr. Snuffer goes through detailed apologies and attempted
explanations

as to why he did not respond to the discovery.

Nowhere, however, does he explain to the Court why he still has not
seen fit to provide the specific information concerning experts and
the documents concerning that same testimony.
launches

into a long discourse concerning

Rather, he simplythe nature

of

the

Plaintiff's injuries and the work that his firm has done on the
case, and forgets to address the issues at hand.

As previously

stated, the case of Larson v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984),
makes consideration of the merits of the case inappropriate when
seeking relief from judgment.
In summary, even should the Court somehow believe that
Plaintiffs counsel did not have proper notice of the Court's Order
Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel and the Motion to Dismiss,
Mr. Snuffer cannot explain why he has still failed to respond to
-17-

the outstanding discovery.

Under these circumstances, the failure

to respond simply cannot be excusable neglect.

The information

requested in discovery was the very information that the Plaintiff
was prepared to present at trial within a day or two of January 10,
when the Court ordered the trial beginning January 11 continued.
Plaintiff's counsel has simply disregarded the motion to compel and
ignored the Order of the Court and still continues to be in
noncompliance with that Order.

Under these circumstances and for

the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from
Judgment

should

be

denied

and

the

Order

of

April

28,

1994

dismissing all of Plaintiff's claims for relief, should be upheld.
DATED this

day of May, 1994.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

TEBRWHJ
PEANT
Attorney for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I served by hand delivery a true
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT this 1&* day of May, 1994, upon
the following:
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorney for Plaintiff
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070

TMP:lrj/91-526.77
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